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1966 ]

BIANNUAL SURVEY

It would appear that this case is authority (at least in the first
department) for the enforcement of a judgment, by contempt,
against any defendant found by the court to be a "constructive
trustee."
With respect to the court's construction of CPLR 5105(2) it
should be remembered that the public policy of this state is vigorously opposed to imprisonment for debt. 95 It is, in fact, this very
policy that prohibits the use of the contempt power to enforce
purely legal money judgments. 19
It is respectfully submitted,
therefore, that as the use of the contempt power is broadened,
courts must remain mindful of our policy and assure defendants
sufficient protection against any possible misuse of this section.
ARTICLE

52- ENFORCEMENT

OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5201: Determinationof what is a debt subject to attachment.
Recently, the issue of the attachability of certain commercial
paper was raised in New York.'
Involved were twenty drafts
with a face value of $100,000 each drawn on a Uruguayan bank
and guaranteed by the central bank of Uruguay. The drafts were
scheduled to be sold in New York, but this was prevented by
the petitioner's attachment. Subsequently, the Uruguayan bank
became insolvent. The court held that these drafts were not
attachable, noting that the instruments on their face did not represent money owed to the bank, but rather money owed by it.
Thus it was held that the drafts were not property, and therefore,
unattachable. 9 s It was noted, however, that if the respondent
had obligated itself to purchase all or part of the drafts, there would
have existed a debt running to the bank which would be susceptible of attachment. In response to the argument that the
written instruments themselves, as distinguished from the rights to
which they related, 99 were attachable, the court considered the drafts
to have no intrinsic value, and thus refused to order an attachment
of these "trifles."
In essence, this case portrays to the practitioner the difficulties
created by a premature levy. If the creditors of the bank had
waited until the issuance of the drafts, the conditions of the guaranty
of the central bank of Uruguay would have been met and the
195 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 21; Burns v. Newnan, 274 App. Div.
301,9 83 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1st Dep't 1948).
' See 5 W=sTIN, KoiR & MmLnn, NEw Yoax CIvIL PRAcricE ff 5105.07
(1965).
197

Underwriters Bank, Inc. v. First Chicago Int'l Banking Corp., 47

Misc. 2d 539, 262 N.Y.S2d 828 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
10s Cf. Coddington v. Gilbert, 17 N.Y. 489 (1858).
"IsN.Y. GEN. COxSTR. LAW § 39.
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guaranty made effective. In addition, the debts owed to the bank
from the sale of the drafts would also be attachable. The court's
holding that these drafts were not a property within the meaning
of CPLR 5201 and thus not subject to attachment appears
justifiable.
CPLR 5208:

Enforcement after death of judgment debtor;
leave of court.

In In re Casey's Estate,200 the administratrix of an estate commenced a proceeding in the surrogate's court to vacate a restraining
notice issued pursuant to CPLR 5222 to enforce a judgment obtained against the debtor's representative. The creditor's contention,
that the surrogate's court lacked the authority to grant such relief,
was rejected and the notice vacated. In so doing, the court
noted that CPLR 5208 prohibits the enforcement of a money judgment after the death of the debtor without leave of the surrogate's
court which granted letters of administration upon the estate.
The court noted that, without the surrogate's leave, Article 52
enforcement procedures are not effective against the property of the
deceased when the judgment was obtained prior to his death but
where execution was delayed until after death. The court reasoned,
therefore, that no greater relief should be afforded a creditor whose
judgment was obtained initially against the deceased's representative.
CPLR 5222: Restraining Notices.
In

Sumitomo Shoji v. Chemical Bank N.Y.

20 1
Trust Co.,

the court was presented with the issue of determining the effectiveness
of a restraining notice served upon a bank. The restraining notice
specified several accounts, two of which were corporate checking
accounts not in the judgment debtor's name. Subsequently, the
bank honored checks signed and made payable to "cash" by the
debtor which closed out these corporate checking accounts. The
bank contended that since there had been no adjudication as to
the judgment debtor's interest in these accounts, it was obligated
20 2
to honor the checks or suffer liability for wrongful dishonor.
The court held that by disregarding the restraining notice, the bank
assumed the risk of liability if the creditor could establish that the
corporate accounts constituted property of the debtor. The court
then directed that this issue be set for trial.
The creditor subsequently moved to reargue the question of
the bank's liability, setting up a summary judgment obtained pursuant
20046

1965).

Misc. 2d 776, 260 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Surr. Ct. Rensselaer County

20147 Misc. 2d 741, 263 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
202 N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 4-302, 4-402.

